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NOTES 
Eat Your Vitamins and Say Your 
Prayers: Bollea v. Gawker, Revenge 
Litigation Funding, and the Fate of the 
Fourth Estate 
NICOLE K. CHIPI* 
In August 2016, Gawker.com shut down after 14 years of—more 
often than not—controversial online publishing. The website was 
one of several Gawker Media properties crushed under the weight 
of a $140 million jury verdict awarded to Terry Bollea (better known 
as former professional wrestler Hulk Hogan), in a lawsuit financed 
by eccentric Silicon Valley billionaire Peter Thiel. Thiel’s clandes-
tine legal campaign was part of a vendetta against Gawker Media, 
a venture he confirms was singularly focused on bankrupting the 
company through litigation. His success sent shudders through the 
media world, demonstrating that determined actors with deep pock-
ets could sue the Fourth Estate out of existence. 
This Note explores the strategy employed by actors like Thiel, 
who have weaponized third-party litigation funding as a means of 
attacking and silencing an already weakened free press. While these 
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“revenge litigation funding” schemes are fueled by the same kind of 
nefarious ends that underlie the rationale of champerty and mainte-
nance—the legal doctrines that historically restricted third-party 
litigation funding—their protections do not sufficiently address the 
issue. This Note suggests additional avenues by which this threat 
might be ameliorated, including the adoption of stronger anti-
SLAPP statutes, increased regulation of third-party litigation fund-
ing, and amendments to the discovery rules that would more readily 
unveil the presence of a vengeful funder. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Third-party litigation funding is most simply defined as a prac-
tice through which an external party, who has no other connection 
with the litigation, funds a litigant’s case.1 Traditionally banned by 
the common law doctrines of champerty and maintenance, third-
party litigation funding has seen a modern resurgence in Australia, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States.2 While the practice has 
                                                                                                             
 1 See Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is this Anyway? Third-Party Litigation 
Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268, 1275–76 (2011). 
 2 Id. at 1278–81. 
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steadily gained prominence in the U.S. among sophisticated inves-
tors, it became the subject of intense media scrutiny following the 
revelation that eccentric Silicon Valley billionaire Peter Thiel had 
secretly bankrolled several cases against Gawker Media—one of 
which resulted in the bankruptcy and permanent dismantling of the 
news site.3 
Though litigation funding industry experts have been quick to 
dismiss the case as an “outlier,”4 this Note will examine the impli-
cations of allowing third-party litigation funding to be used by 
vengeful actors targeting news media. This Note will particularly 
focus on the so-called “chilling effect”5 of the Bollea v. Gawker 
award, and the effect the practice could have on the future of the 
Fourth Estate. 
Part I will provide a brief overview of the historical restrictions 
against third-party litigation funding and the modern manifestation 
of the practice in foreign jurisdictions and the United States. Part II 
will recount relevant portions of the Bollea v. Gawker Media con-
troversy, including Peter Thiel’s vendetta against Gawker, and the 
means through which he bankrolled claims against the news site. 
Part III will examine how Thiel’s model of “revenge litigation fund-
ing” is impervious to normal market constraints that typically apply 
to the threat of meritless claims, the chilling effect he and other ac-
tors have had on press coverage, and how the threat to the Fourth 
Estate might be ameliorated through the protections afforded by the 
legal rationale underlying traditional doctrines of champerty and 
maintenance. This Note will conclude with suggestions for other po-
tential regulatory, procedural, and legislative defenses against re-
venge litigation funding tactics. 
                                                                                                             
 3 See Sara Randazzo, Hulk Hogan Case Stirs Funding-Disclosure Debate, 
WALL ST. J. (May 27, 2016, 1:48 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/hulk-hogan-
case-stirs-funding-disclosure-debate-1464371324. 
 4 See id. 
 5 See Vivek Wadhwa, The Chilling Effect Peter Thiel’s Battle with Gawker 
Could Have on Silicon Valley Journalism, WASH. POST (May 27, 2016), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2016/05/27/the-chilling-effect-
peter-thiels-battle-with-gawker-could-have-on-silicon-valley-journalism/?utm_
term=.c54360755951. 
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I. THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING: A LEGACY OF 
RESTRICTION AND A MODERN REBIRTH 
The practice of third-party litigation funding is best understood 
first by defining the common law doctrines that have traditionally 
prohibited the practice, and then by exploring the modern manifes-
tations of the practice in the United States and abroad. 
Third-party litigation funding refers to funding methods that em-
ploy resources from insurance markets, capital markets, or a private 
fund in lieu of a litigant’s own funds. This is distinguished from the 
analogous (and commonplace) practice of contingency fees, 
whereby an attorney agrees to accept payment contingent upon the 
outcome of the case.6 This term should also be understood as distinct 
from “consumer” third-party litigation funding, which traditionally 
involves an individual plaintiff (often in a personal injury case) who 
seeks funding for his or her claim, typically in the form of an ad-
vance.7 A typical third-party funding arrangement would consist of 
a specialist finance company or hedge fund paying a firm’s fees on 
an interim basis in exchange for a promised percentage of the award, 
up to an agreed cap.8 Typically, the funder will contract directly with 
the client, though agreements between funder and attorney are also 
employed.9 
Revenge litigation funding, on the other hand, should be under-
stood to describe the tactic employed by actors like Thiel, who seek 
to utilize the vehicle of third-party litigation funding to weaponize 
                                                                                                             
 6 Contingent fee, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 7 See Susan Lorde Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry: The Wild West 
of Finance Should Be Tamed Not Outlawed, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 55, 
63 (2004). These “consumer” lending operations have often engaged in predatory 
lending schemes, akin to the kind of subprime mortgage lending that led to the 
recent housing crisis and subsequent recession. Id. at 63–64. While they undoubt-
edly merit academic scrutiny, the practice is beyond the scope of what should be 
understood as third-party litigation funding within the meaning of this article. 
 8 See Steinitz, supra note 1, at 1275–76. 
 9 See id. at 1276. The structure of the funding arrangement utilized in the 
case discussed herein is unknown. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Peter Thiel, Tech 
Billionaire, Reveals Secret War with Gawker, N.Y. TIMES: DEALB%K (May 25, 
2016), http://nyti.ms/1sbe6AU. Significantly, it is not known whether Peter Thiel 
was reimbursed for the costs associated with litigation (which are speculated to 
hover around $10 million), or if he received an additional percentage of the award 
recovered. Id. 
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torts against a specific target (in Thiel’s case, Gawker Media). Un-
like typical third-party litigation funders, revenge litigation funders 
are not necessarily interested in a return on investment, but instead 
hope to use the legal system to carry out their own vendettas.10 
A. Historical Restriction: Champerty and Maintenance 
Put broadly, the definition of maintenance in common law is “an 
officious intermeddling in a suit which in no way belongs to the in-
termeddler by maintaining or assisting either party to the action, 
with money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend it.”11 From the Old 
French champart,12 champerty is a specific form of maintenance in 
which an agreement is made to divide the proceeds of litigation be-
tween the owner of the claim and an unrelated party who supports 
the claim.13 The concepts of champerty and maintenance have ori-
gins in ancient Greek and Roman law,14 but first appeared in English 
law in a series of statutes by Edward I, who decreed them criminal 
offenses.15 At the time, the prohibition of these practices was pri-
marily intended to prevent the abuse of judicial processes, particu-
larly by feudal lords.16 Significantly, the doctrine was also intro-
duced to counteract support from disinterested third parties who 
could encourage or support litigation out of malicious intent towards 
a rival.17 These nobles and land barons would often use their titles 
to intimidate the courts and aggrandize their own estates, typically 
by lending their names to claims in which they had no legitimate 
interest, in return for a share of the property recovered.18 In other 
words, the development of the doctrine of champerty was motivated 
                                                                                                             
 10 See Sorkin, supra note 9. Per Thiel: “[w]ithout going into all the details, 
we would get in touch with the plaintiffs who otherwise would have accepted a 
pittance for a settlement, and they were obviously quite happy to have this sort of 
support . . . . I would underscore that I don’t expect to make any money from this. 
This is not a business venture.” Id. 
 11 14 AM. JUR. 2D Champerty, Maintenance, Etc. § 1 (2017). 
 12 See Ari Dobner, Litigation for Sale, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1529, 1544 (1996). 
 13 Champerty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 14 See Dobner, supra note 12, at 1543. 
 15 Modern Views of Champerty and Maintenance, 18 HARV. L. REV. 222, 222 
(1905). 
 16 Id. at 223. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
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by an interest in remedying unjust practices by “great men”19 that 
preyed upon a vulnerable judicial system. 
B. The Resurgence of Third-Party Litigation Funding 
While many argue that the feudal concerns underlying the de-
velopment of these doctrines have long since lost their relevance, 
modern policy rationale in support of restrictions against champerty 
reflect some of the same preoccupations.20 For example, an oft-cited 
motivation for laws against these doctrines is a desire to deter friv-
olous, unnecessary, or speculative litigation.21 Likewise, courts have 
upheld champerty restrictions out of a desire to prevent unfair deal-
ings—particularly in situations where a party in a dominant bargain-
ing position is afforded excessive profits by its ability to purchase 
another party’s claim.22 These public policy preoccupations have led 
the majority of common law countries (and states in the United 
States) to retain and enforce the prohibition of champerty.23 Never-
theless, the past two decades have seen a few foreign (and some do-
mestic) jurisdictions—predominantly, Australia and the United 
Kingdom—abandon or relax these restrictions, allowing for the de-
velopment of third-party litigation funding markets.24 
In Australia, both the courts and the legislature have taken 
strides to relax champerty restrictions.25 In the landmark case on this 
issue, Campbells Cash and Carry Pty. Ltd. v. Fostif Pty Ltd., the 
Australian high court permitted a third-party funding agreement, 
even though the funder had broad control over the course of litiga-
tion.26 In that case, the funder sought out small tobacco retailers as 
plaintiffs in a case that would seek the recovery of license fees from 
tobacco wholesalers.27 The funding agreement gave the funder con-
                                                                                                             
 19 See Thallhimer v. Brinckerhoff, 3 Cow. 623, 644 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824). 
 20 See Steinitz, supra note 1, at 1288. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. at 1289. 
 24 See id. at 1278. 
 25 See Lee Aitken, Before the High Court: ‘Litigation Lending’ After Fostif, 
28 SYDNEY L. REV. 171, 180 (2006). 
 26 (2006) 229 CLR 386, 388 (Austl.). 
 27 See id. 
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trol over the choice of counsel and the right to settle with the de-
fendants for up to 75% of the amount to be claimed.28 The funder 
received 33% of the award in exchange for paying all of the costs of 
litigation.29 
The High Court of Australia considered the practical and ethical 
concerns in question, reasoning that the presence of the funder af-
forded access to justice for the small retailers, who otherwise could 
not afford a lawsuit against the wholesalers.30 The court also em-
ployed freedom-to-contract rationale, noting that the plaintiff has a 
right to enter into a funding agreement, even where it equated to 
relinquishing “control” over the claim.31 Since the decision in Fostif, 
the High Court of Australia has interpreted the case as a ban on any 
rule that would prohibit the funding of litigation in return for an 
award, essentially declaring the end of restrictions on champerty and 
maintenance.32 
In England, the Criminal Law Act of 1967 abolished any crimi-
nal or civil liability for champerty, but did not go so far as to affect 
rules that would allow for the treatment of contracts as illegal or 
contrary to public policy.33 This legislative posture allowed for a 
great deal of discretion in the English courts, which tended to carry 
forward a relaxed approach to champerty law.34 However, this pro-
gressive attitude had its limits. In 2005, the English Court of Appeal 
held that while third-party litigation funding agreements are ac-
ceptable, the funder should not have control over the management 
of litigation.35 
Despite this tempered approach, the English Court of Appeal’s 
declaration that third-party litigation funding was permissible (and 
even a desirable method of improving access to justice) created 
“competitive pressures” on law firms based in the United States.36 
These pressures, coupled with the effects of the global economic 
                                                                                                             
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 See Steinitz, supra note 1, at 1280. 
 33 Criminal Law Act 1967, c. 58, § 14 (Eng.). 
 34 See Steinitz, supra note 1, at 1280–81. 
 35 See id. at 1281. 
 36 See id. at 1282. 
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crisis,37 led to a “growing discontent with champerty restrictions” 
among certain jurisdictions within the United States.38 
As a result, the law of champerty in the United States varies by 
jurisdiction.39 While the majority of states retain and enforce cham-
perty restrictions, a growing minority have relaxed or abandoned 
them altogether.40 The State of New York, for example, has adopted 
a progressive position towards the doctrine, choosing to enforce it 
only in cases where an acquisition was made for the express purpose 
of bringing an action or proceeding.41 States that have abandoned 
the doctrine entirely typically do so under the rationale that it is no 
longer needed to protect against the threats of injustice once feared, 
citing to ethical rules and procedural safeguards that effectively pro-
tect against judicial abuse.42 As stated by one of the most prominent 
third-party litigation funding entities in the world, “the reality as to 
champerty and its cousins is that modern day litigation has evolved, 
and concepts such as Rule 11 and a strong independent judiciary 
have taken their place.”43 
Nevertheless, in states that continue to enforce champerty laws, 
the common law rule is comprised of three essential elements: 
(1) the fee of the person who would seek to enforce 
the allegedly champertous agreement must come 
from the recovery in a successful lawsuit, (2) that 
person must have no independent claim to the recov-
ery fund, and (3) the costs and expenses must be 
borne by that person with no expectation of reim-
bursement from the other party to the allegedly 
champertous agreement.44 
On its face, the typical third-party funding arrangement de-
scribed herein would seem to satisfy these elements. And, when 
                                                                                                             
 37 See id. at 1283. 
 38 See id. at 1290. 
 39 See id. at 1289. 
 40 See id. 
 41 Id. at 1289–90. 
 42 See id. at 1290. 
 43 Litigation Finance Is Not Champerty, Maintenance or Barratry, BURFORD 
CAP. (July 30, 2013), http://www.burfordcapital.com/blog/litigation-finance-not-
champerty-maintenance-barratry/. 
 44 7 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 15.1 (4th ed.). 
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evaluating a potentially champertous agreement, courts that con-
tinue to apply the doctrine appear unmoved by the logic of states 
that are satisfied by the existence of modern alternative safeguards.45 
For example, in 2004, the Minnesota Court of Appeals dismissed a 
respondent’s appeal raising such arguments, noting that though 
these alternatives might “alleviate the potential evils associated with 
champertous agreements,” they do not stand as a compelling argu-
ment to abandon the champerty doctrine entirely, even if a few states 
have seen fit to do so.46 
Though the existence of champerty restrictions in a given juris-
diction may foster hesitation in those seeking to engage in third-
party litigation funding agreements, decisions in states that hold fast 
to the doctrine suggest that the two are not mutually exclusive.47 In 
a recent decision from the Superior Court of Delaware (a state that 
enforces champerty restrictions48), the court held that a third-party 
litigation funding agreement was not champertous because, among 
other reasons, the third-party funder had not encouraged the plaintiff 
“to enforce claims which [it was] not disposed to prosecute.”49 The 
court reasoned that because champerty “is based upon the ground 
that no encouragement should be given to litigation by the introduc-
tion of a party to enforce those rights which the owners are not dis-
posed to prosecute,” to be champertous, the third-party funder 
would have to encourage the party to the claim to introduce or en-
force claims it was not interested in pursuing originally.50 
Moreover, the Delaware court held that the funder did not qual-
ify as an “officious intermeddler” because the party holding the 
claim sought out their assistance (rather than the funder seeking out 
                                                                                                             
 45 See Steinitz, supra note 1, at 1289. 
 46 Johnson v. Wright, 628 N.W.2d 671, 680 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004). 
 47 See, e.g., Charge Injection Techs., Inc. v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 
No. NO7C–12–134–JRJ, 2016 WL 937400, at *1, *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 9, 
2016). The court also noted that the agreement was not champertous because the 
claim was not assigned to the funder. Id. 
 48 See, e.g., Hall v. State, 655 A.2d 827, 830 (Del. Super. Ct. 1994) (emphasis 
added) (quoting another source); see also Street Search Partners, L.P. v. Ricon 
Int’l, L.L.C., No. 04C–09–191–PLA, 2006 WL 1313859, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. 
May 12, 2006). 
 49 See Charge Injection Tech., Inc., 2016 WL 937400, at *4. 
 50 Id. 
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potential plaintiffs).51 As the court stressed, the funder’s lack of di-
rection or control over the litigation was significant in its decision 
that the funding agreement did not violate champerty and mainte-
nance doctrines.52 Specifically, the court noted that the third-party 
funder was not an officious intermeddler within the meaning of the 
maintenance doctrine because they had not “‘stirred up’ litigation” 
and was not “controlling the litigation for the purpose of continuing 
a frivolous or unwanted lawsuit.”53 
Conversely, a recent decision in the Superior Court of Pennsyl-
vania has left the fate of third-party litigation funding agreements in 
that jurisdiction uncertain.54 In WFIC, LLC v. Labarre, the court 
held that a complex third-party litigation funding agreement met the 
definition of champerty.55 The case arose when an attorney working 
on a contingency basis in an underlying matter restructured the con-
tingency fee agreement so that he would receive 33% of the award 
as his fee, with the provision that repayment of the third-party liti-
gation funder would come from his share.56 When the attorney’s cli-
ent lost an appeal for a larger award in the case, the attorney was left 
without any compensation for his work after litigation funders were 
paid their portion of the award.57 As a result, the attorney sued the 
funder to recover the fees he believed he was due, arguing that his 
fee should be considered a lien against the client’s recovery and, as 
such, should have been paid before the investors.58 The court disa-
greed, holding that the funding agreement was champertous and that 
the attorney was entitled to nothing.59 
While LaBarre is perhaps distinguished by the fact that the un-
derlying agreement was unusually complex, the court’s rationale 
that it was champertous because “[t]he requisite elements of cham-
perty have all clearly been met” is quite broad, providing little guid-
ance as to when and whether the doctrine will apply.60 A lawyer who 
                                                                                                             
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at *5. 
 54 See WFIC, LLC v. Labarre, 148 A.3d 812, 819 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016). 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 815. 
 57 Id. at 815–16. 
 58 Id. at 816. 
 59 Id. at 819. 
 60 Id. 
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represented the funder in the case observed that the court seemed 
“concerned about whether the lawyer had a controlling say in the 
resolution of the litigation,” but also noted that the implication for 
third-party litigation funding in Pennsylvania “remains to be 
seen.”61 
In sum, despite what has been described as a “growing discon-
tent” with the doctrines of champerty and maintenance in jurisdic-
tions across the United States,62 the doctrines remain among the 
greatest obstacles for those who wish to see the expansion of the 
third-party litigation funding industry.63 However, the patchwork of 
jurisdictions enforcing these restrictions (and the mélange of inter-
pretations of the doctrine in those jurisdictions) creates a great deal 
of uncertainty regarding their effect on the legality of third-party 
funding agreements in the United States. These nuanced approaches 
aside, jurisdictions that enforce champerty and maintenance re-
strictions appear to be, at the very least, in agreement that courts 
should not uphold third-party litigation funding arrangements that 
allow for funders to meddle in the management and strategy of liti-
gation. This specific preoccupation is echoed by the numerous ethics 
rules that demand an attorney exercise independent professional 
judgment, free from financial or other considerations.64 This appar-
ent united front against third-party meddling will prove significant 
to the discussion of the implications of Bollea v. Gawker Media, 
particularly as it pertains to the chain of events that led to the reali-
zation that a third-party litigation funder was at play in the case. 
                                                                                                             
 61 Alison Frankel, Pennsylvania Appeals Court Tosses Litigation Funding 
Deal as Champerty, REUTERS (Oct. 5, 2016), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-
frankel/2016/10/05/pennsylvania-appeals-court-tosses-litigation-funding-deal-
as-champerty/. 
 62 See Steinitz, supra note 1, at 1290. 
 63 Other threats to the legality of third-party funding agreements include at-
torney ethics rules that prohibit fee sharing with non-lawyers. See MODEL RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT, r. 1.5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
 64 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, r. 5.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 
1983) (“A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays 
the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer’s 
professional judgment in rendering such legal services.”); see also id. at r. 1.8(f) 
(“A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other 
than the client unless: (1) the client gives informed consent; (2) there is no inter-
ference with the lawyer’s independence of professional judgment or with the cli-
ent-lawyer relationship . . . .”). 
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II. BOLLEA V. GAWKER AND PETER THIEL’S VENDETTA 
In early 2012, reports began to surface that a sex tape featuring 
Terry Bollea, better known as professional wrestler Hulk Hogan, 
had been offered for sale to Vivid, an adult entertainment com-
pany.65 The footage, which Hogan claims was taken without his 
knowledge, captured him in flagrante delicto with a woman named 
Heather Clem—the then-wife of his best friend, radio disc jockey 
Bubba “the Love Sponge” Clem (“Bubba”).66 Bubba, for his part, 
admits to recording the video and burning it onto a DVD (which he 
labeled “Hogan”), but denies any involvement in the tape’s re-
lease.67 
Several months after initial reports of the video’s existence, a 
burned DVD copy of the thirty-minute footage was delivered to 
Gawker Media through an anonymous source.68 The source report-
edly asked for no payment or credit for the video.69 On October 4, 
2012, Gawker published a one-minute clip of the thirty-minute 
video that included footage of Hogan and Heather Clem engaged in 
sexually explicit activity.70 The abridged video generated five mil-
lion page views on Gawker’s site and was promptly re-posted on 
other websites.71 
The following day, David Houston—Hogan’s personal attor-
ney—issued a takedown demand requesting that Gawker immedi-
ately remove the video from the site.72 Houston added that if Gawker 
                                                                                                             
 65 Hulk Hogan Sex Tape Being Shopped, TMZ: SPORTS (Mar. 7, 2012, 1:00 
AM), http://www.tmz.com/2012/03/07/hulk-hogan-sex-tape/. 
 66 Tasneem Nashrulla & Mary Ann Georgantopoulos, “I Was Completely 
Humiliated”: Hulk Hogan Testifies About Sex Tape, BUZZFEED: NEWS (Mar. 7, 
2016, 12:12 PM), www.buzzfeed.com/tasneemnashrulla/hulk-hogans-lawyer-
says-gawker-posted-his-sex-tape-for-power?utm_term=.gepp4Kz22#.yirvpJ8rr. 
 67 Id. 
 68 A.J. Daulerio, Even for a Minute, Watching Hulk Hogan Have Sex in a 
Canopy Bed Is Not Safe for Work but Watch It Anyway, GAWKER (Oct. 4, 2012, 
2:15 PM), https://unv.is/gawker.com/5948770/even-for-a-minute-watching-hulk-
hogan-have-sex-in-a-canopy-bed-is-not-safe-for-work-but-watch-it-anyway#. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Nick Madigan, Hulk Hogan Takes Stand in His Sex-Tape Lawsuit Against 
Gawker, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/08/busi-
ness/media/hulk-hogan-sex-tape-gawker-lawsuit.html. 
 72 Jeffrey Toobin, Gawker’s Demise and the Trump-era Threat to the First 
Amendment, NEW YORKER: ANNALS OF LAW (Dec. 19, 2016), http://www.
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removed the video, Hogan would consider the matter resolved and 
would not file suit.73 Nick Denton, founder of Gawker Media, re-
fused to take it down.74 With requests for removal falling on deaf 
ears, Houston reportedly began to search for a way to force Gawker 
to remove the post.75 
Enter (notoriously eccentric76) Silicon Valley billionaire, Peter 
Thiel. As a co-founder of PayPal,77 and Facebook’s first outside in-
vestor, Thiel’s net worth is estimated at $3 billion.78 Through his 
venture capital firm, Founders Fund, Thiel also led early invest-
ments in platforms like Spotify, Airbnb, Lyft, and Palantir Technol-
ogies.79 
While Thiel’s investment prowess is well-documented, his 
unique—and, at times, polarizing—views are equally storied. De-
spite the fact that he is a Stanford-educated attorney, Thiel is op-
posed to higher education and famously established a fellowship 
that gives promising students $100,000 to drop out of college.80 A 
radical libertarian, Thiel also funded a project that aims to create an 
                                                                                                             
newyorker.com/magazine/2016/12/19/gawkers-demise-and-the-trump-era-
threat-to-the-first-amendment. 
 73 Charles Harder, Hulk Hogan’s Lead Lawyer Explains How His Team Beat 
“Arrogant,” “Defiant” Gawker, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Apr. 5, 2016, 7:55 AM), 
www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/how-hulk-hogan-beat-gawker-880687. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Max Chafkin & Lizette Chapman, The Strange Politics of Peter Thiel, 
Trump’s Most Unlikely Supporter, BLOOMBERG: BUSINESSWEEK (July 21, 2016, 
9:46 AM), www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-21/the-strange-politics-
of-peter-thiel-trump-s-most-unlikely-supporter. 
 77 See id. In fact, Thiel is the perceived “ringleader” of the so-called PayPal 
Mafia—a cohort of former PayPal colleagues that includes Tesla’s Elon Musk 
and LinkedIn’s Reid Hoffman. Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. Palantir Technologies is a $20 billion secretive data-analytics start-up 
employed by the likes of the National Security Administration, the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Matt Burns, Leaked Pal-
antir Doc Reveals Uses, Specific Functions and Key Clients, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 
11, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/01/11/leaked-palantir-doc-reveals-uses-
specific-functions-and-key-clients/. 
 80 THE THIEL FELLOWSHIP, http://thielfellowship.org/ (last visited Sept. 30, 
2017). 
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offshore colony that will be free of any governmental interference.81 
More recently, Thiel has expressed doubts about the merits of a 
democratic society and the benefits of women’s suffrage.82 He also 
famously campaigned for, and contributed to, Donald Trump’s can-
didacy during the 2016 presidential election—a move met with a 
mixture of befuddlement and damnation from his peers, the media, 
and the public at large.83 
Though Thiel’s public views have garnered considerable criti-
cism from the press, his vendetta against Gawker began in 200784 
when the website’s Vallywag blog “outed” him with an article head-
lined, “Peter Thiel is totally gay, people.”85 To hear Thiel tell it, 
Gawker is a “singularly terrible bully” that “ruined people’s lives 
for no reason.”86 In fact, Thiel’s disdain for Gawker is such that he 
has gone so far as to call the news outlet the “Silicon Valley equiv-
alent of Al Qaeda.”87 
In the sole interview granted on the subject, Thiel admitted that 
his contempt for Gawker inspired him to fund a team of lawyers (led 
by celebrity attorney Charles Harder) to locate and assist other 
Gawker “victims” in mounting cases against the news site.88 As fate 
would have it, Hogan turned out to be an ideal candidate for Thiel’s 
legal assault against Gawker. While Harder’s own account of the 
                                                                                                             
 81 THE SEASTEADING INSTITUTE, https://www.seasteading.org/ (last visited 
Sept. 30, 2017). 
 82 Peter Thiel, The Education of a Libertarian, CATO UNBOUND (Apr. 13, 
2009), www.cato-unbound.org/2009/04/13/peter-thiel/education-libertarian. 
 83 Chafkin & Chapman, supra note 76. 
 84 Sorkin, supra note 9. 
 85 Owen Thomas, Peter Thiel Is Totally Gay, People, GAWKER: VALLEYWAG 
(Dec. 19, 2007, 7:05 PM), http://gawker.com/335894/peter-thiel-is-totally-gay-
people. It is significant to note that Owen Thomas and Gawker Media continue to 
contend, despite Thiel’s protestations to the contrary, that the article did not in 
fact “out” him. Thiel’s family, friends, and many of his colleagues were already 
aware of his sexual orientation. See Nick Denton, An Open Letter to Peter Thiel, 
GAWKER (May 26, 2016, 4:35 PM), http://gawker.com/an-open-letter-to-peter-
thiel-1778991227. 
 86 Sorkin, supra note 9. 
 87 Connie Loizos, Peter Thiel on Valleywag; It’s the “Silicon Valley Equiva-
lent of Al Qaeda”, PE HUB (May 18, 2009), https://www.pehub.com/2009/05/pe-
ter-thiel-on-valleywag-its-the-silicon-valley-equivalent-of-al-qaeda/. 
 88 Sorkin, supra note 9. 
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trial omits any mention of Thiel’s involvement,89 Thiel ultimately 
invested a reported $10 million in the case.90 
Though details regarding the manner of Harder’s initial engage-
ment remain unclear, once retained by Hogan, the attorney (and a 
legal team that included First Amendment expert David Mirell91) 
filed suit in federal court against Gawker Media, its founder Nick 
Denton, and then editor-in-chief of Gawker and author of the sex 
tape post, A.J. Daulerio.92 Harder filed a second claim in state court 
against Bubba and Heather Clem, the couple who recorded Hogan, 
allegedly without his knowledge.93 Hogan would eventually settle 
his claims against Bubba Clem in exchange for, among other things, 
control of the copyright for the sex tape.94 
Hogan’s federal suit included claims for invasion of privacy by 
intrusion upon seclusion, publication of private facts, violation of 
the Florida common law right of publicity, intentional infliction of 
                                                                                                             
 89 Harder, supra note 73. 
 90 Sorkin, supra note 9. 
 91 See Drange, infra note 112. Ironically, prior to joining forces with Harder, 
Mirell was best known as a defender of the First Amendment. He was perhaps 
most famous for arguments against gag orders in the O.J. Simpson trial and as 
president of the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Southern Califor-
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Now Working for Melania Trump and Roger Ailes, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 14, 2016, 
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ailes-people-magazine-509926; see also Dave Simpson, Harvey Weinstein Taps 
Glaser Weil Partner After Firing, LAW360 (Oct. 10, 2017, 10:54 PM), www.
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ing. 
 92 See Harder, supra note 73. On June 28, 2017, a New York bankruptcy 
judge ruled that the Gawker estate could engage in discovery regarding Thiel’s 
communications with Harder leading up to the Hogan trial. See Andrew Strickler, 
Gawker’s Probe of Thiel Keeps Harsh Light on Legal Funders, LAW360 (July 7, 
2017, 5:16 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/941789/gawker-s-probe-of-
thiel-keeps-harsh-light-on-legal-funders. As a result of the order, additional de-
tails regarding the specifics of Thiel’s arrangement with Hogan may eventually 
come to light. 
 93 Harder, supra note 73. 
 94 See Toobin, supra note 72. 
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emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.95 
In a press conference held on the day of the filing, Harder announced 
that Hogan would seek $100 million in damages, claiming that 
Gawker’s actions “exceeded the bounds of human decency.”96 A 
few days later, Hogan’s legal team filed a motion for preliminary 
injunction that would require Gawker to remove the video posted on 
the site.97 A federal district court judge denied Hogan’s request, 
along with a subsequent motion seeking injunctive relief on the basis 
of a copyright claim.98 In his ruling, Judge James D. Whittemore 
hinted he would give deference to Gawker’s argument that the video 
was newsworthy, writing that: 
Plaintiff’s public persona, including the publicity he 
and his family derived from a television reality show 
detailing their personal life, his own book describing 
an affair he had during his marriage, prior reports by 
other parties of the existence and content of the 
Video, and Plaintiff’s own public discussion of is-
sues relating to his marriage, sex life, and the Video 
all demonstrate that the Video is a subject of general 
interest and concern to the community.99  
Not to be discouraged, Hogan’s legal team voluntarily dismissed 
the federal case and amended the state court claim, adding Gawker 
Media, Denton, and Daulerio as defendants, and essentially assert-
ing the same claims as in the federal case.100 Gawker promptly at-
tempted to remove the case to federal court, but the district court 
rejected its arguments and remanded the case in favor of Hogan.101 
                                                                                                             
 95 See Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, 913 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1327 (M.D. Fla. 
2012). 
 96 See Harder, supra note 73; see also Ryan Mac & Matt Drange, Behind 
Peter Thiel’s Plan to Destroy Gawker, FORBES: TECH (June 7, 2016, 2:51 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanmac/2016/06/07/behind-peter-thiel-plan-to-de-
stroy-gawker/#35d90c7a5848. 
 97 See Bollea, 913 F. Supp. 2d at 1327. 
 98 Toobin, supra note 72. 
 99 See Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, No. 8:12–cv–02348–T–27TBM, 2012 
WL 5509624, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 2012). 
 100 Harder, supra note 73. 
 101 See Bollea v. Clem, 937 F. Supp. 1344, 1348 (M.D. Fla. 2013). 
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Hogan’s request for a preliminary injunction fared better with 
the Honorable Pamela A.M. Campbell of the Pinellas County Cir-
cuit Court.102 Judge Campbell—who has been reversed on appeal 
more times than any of her colleagues in Pinellas County103—
granted the injunction, but failed to make any findings of fact in the 
written order to support her decision, or to require Hogan to post a 
bond for the injunction as required by Florida law.104 Gawker im-
mediately, and successfully, appealed.105 
Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal reversed the injunc-
tion, holding that it was an unconstitutional prior restraint under the 
First Amendment.106 In an opinion written by Judge Black, the court 
seemed to echo Judge Whittemore’s reasoning, finding that: 
Mr. Bollea . . . enjoyed the spotlight as a professional 
wrestler, and he and his family were depicted in a re-
ality television show detailing their personal lives. 
Mr. Bollea openly discussed an affair he had while 
married to Linda Bollea . . . and otherwise discussed 
his family, marriage, and sex life through various 
media outlets. Further, prior to the publication at is-
sue in this appeal, there were numerous reports by 
various media outlets regarding the existence and 
dissemination of the Sex Tape . . . . It is clear that as 
a result of the public controversy surrounding the af-
fair and the Sex Tape, exacerbated in part by Mr. 
Bollea himself, the report and the related video ex-
cerpts address matters of public concern.107 
                                                                                                             
 102 John Cook, A Judge Told Us to Take Down Our Hulk Hogan Sex Tape 
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As noted by commentators, typically a definitive ruling of this 
kind would sound the death knell for a case like Hogan’s.108 Two 
courts had all but declared that Hogan’s case lacked merit.109 As a 
“single-digit millionaire,”110 he was expected to retreat or, at the 
very least, settle his claims rather than commit to what was sure to 
be a lengthy—and expensive—trial against Gawker in state court.111 
But what Gawker failed to appreciate was that Hogan’s legal 
team planned to go the distance, equipped with a veritable blank 
check from Thiel, their silent benefactor.112 Denton, however, had 
begun to suspect that someone was behind the lawsuit.113 A few 
things tipped Thiel’s hand,114 the most significant being that Hogan 
dropped his claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress—a 
tactic that freed Gawker’s insurance company from liability in the 
case and ensured that any award would need to come directly from 
the news site’s own pockets.115 
Denton’s suspicions aside, the case proceeded to trial in Pinellas 
County Circuit Court, where it reached new theatrical heights.116 
Now in state court, Gawker faced the difficult task of convincing a 
jury of local citizens that publishing a sexually explicit video featur-
ing Hogan—a hometown hero—served a legitimate and newswor-
thy purpose.117 Harder and his legal team flexed their home-court 
                                                                                                             
 108 See Toobin, supra note 72. 
 109 See id. 
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advantage, crafting a narrative that cast Hogan as a local, hardwork-
ing man who “made good” only to be torn down by a group of elitist 
bullies (Gawker).118 Gawker’s lawyers countered by highlighting 
(as Judge Black and Judge Whittemore had) that Hogan had made 
his personal life public by bragging about private matters such as his 
sexual prowess, penis size, and extramarital affairs in his own book 
and in interviews.119 In response, Hogan, who received special per-
mission from Judge Campbell to wear his trademark bandana in 
court, testified that disclosures regarding personal aspects of his life, 
including his sexual escapades, were made when he was in “charac-
ter” as Hulk Hogan, and were therefore separate from the private 
details of his life as Terry Bollea.120 
The six-person jury apparently found credence in this argu-
ment.121 After a ten-day trial and a few hours of deliberation, Hogan 
was awarded $115 million in damages,122 and an additional $15 mil-
lion in punitive damages.123 Gawker filed an appeal in state court, 
but with its coffers exhausted after several years of litigation, the 
company also filed for bankruptcy: a shield that would prevent it 
from having to pay the multi-million-dollar judgment.124 
In an ironic twist, after more than four years in court and several 
rejected offers of settlement, on November 2, 2016, Hogan and 
Gawker Media announced a tentative settlement in the amount of 
$31 million.125 The settlement, funded by proceeds from Gawker 
Media’s sale to Univision Communications, also included a stipula-
tion that Gawker would forgo an appeal.126 As part of the sale to 
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Univision, Gawker has been permanently shuttered.127 In the wake 
of the case (and Gawker’s ultimate demise), media and legal com-
mentators have pondered what effect the success of Thiel’s innova-
tive revenge tactic might have on the future of the “Fourth Es-
tate.”128 
III. THE RISE OF “REVENGE LITIGATION FUNDING” AND THE 
FATE OF THE FOURTH ESTATE 
Bollea v. Gawker and the debate surrounding Thiel’s actions un-
folded against a backdrop of exceptional vulnerability for the press 
at large. The past decade has seen unprecedented decline in media 
revenue, a phenomenon that has left even storied institutions strug-
gling to maintain their ability to produce hard-hitting investigative 
journalism.129 This moment of acute financial weakness is coupled 
with a decline in American confidence in the press.130 According to 
a recent Gallup survey, only 40% of Americans say they have “a 
great deal” or even “a fair amount” of “trust and confidence in the 
mass media to report the news fully, accurately and fairly.”131 While 
the data reflects that this distrust has grown slowly over the past 
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decade,132 recent surveys suggest that, in the wake of the 2016 pres-
idential election, trust in the media continues to rapidly plummet.133 
This Part will argue that the unique threat posed by vindictive 
actors seeking to weaponize the legal system as a means of silencing 
unwanted criticism is not sufficiently ameliorated by current libel 
laws, laws intended to prevent abusive litigation tactics that silence 
critics,134 our modern legal system, or attorneys’ ethics rules. The 
importance of laws that protect against this kind of attack on the 
Fourth Estate will be explored through the American tradition of 
pro-press free expression, the “chilling effect” of cases like Bollea 
v. Gawker, and the building sentiment of hostility toward the press 
in the wake of the election of Donald Trump. Particular attention 
will be given to the argument that the presence of a third-party fun-
der is irrelevant because only claims that have merit pose a threat to 
media outlets. This Part will conclude with an analysis that demon-
strates how the application of traditional views of champerty and 
maintenance doctrines might be employed (or adopted via regula-
tion) to protect against the kind of revenge litigation funding em-
ployed by actors like Thiel. 
A. The “Chilling Effect” and Press Coverage in the Era of 
Trump 
The American tradition of freedom of the press is reflected not 
only in the protections granted by the First Amendment, but also in 
the rigors of American media law. The role of the Fourth Estate as 
a check on abuses of power (from governmental and private forces 
alike), coupled with the sanctity of the First Amendment, motivates 
courts to disfavor actions that “chill” the freedom of the press and 
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 133 See As Election Nears, Voters Divided Over Democracy and ‘Respect’, 
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journalists’ willingness to exercise free speech rights to satisfy their 
duty.135 
This protective stance is most clearly demonstrated in the most 
important case in American media law, New York Times Co. v. Sul-
livan.136 In Sullivan, Justice William Brennan wrote that the Consti-
tution prohibits a federal rule that would allow for a public official 
to recover damages for a defamatory falsehood unless he proves that 
the statement was made with actual malice.137 This high bar, coupled 
with a trend in libel suits favoring outcomes for the defendant,138 
created a major deterrent for plaintiffs and their lawyers seeking to 
harass media outlets with specious claims.139 
Laws barring attack against First Amendment protected press 
activity also manifest in the form of anti-SLAPP statutes.140 A 
SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) is an action 
brought not with the goal of litigating the underlying claim, but with 
the primary purpose of suppressing First Amendment protected ac-
tivity.141 The statutes that protect the right to comment on and par-
ticipate in matters of public concern are rooted in First Amendment 
principles.142 As seen in Hogan’s case,143 what constitutes a matter 
of public concern is not particularly well defined. But generally, a 
matter qualifies as one of public concern when it is the subject of 
                                                                                                             
 135 See, e.g., Multimedia Holdings Corp. v. Circuit Court of Fla., 544 U.S. 
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“great interest and of value and concern to the public”144 without 
regard to whether the commentary in question is “inappropriate or 
controversial.”145 In considering the outcome of Bollea, it is signif-
icant to note that it is common for judges to dismiss lawsuits when 
the plaintiffs themselves have encouraged news interest in the mat-
ter they claim is private.146 
The majority of states have enacted anti-SLAPP statutes that 
shield individuals and the press from attacks by those seeking to si-
lence their critics.147 Among other things, anti-SLAPP statutes pro-
vide procedural protections demanding that those seeking to file a 
lawsuit satisfy an increased burden to prove that they have a legiti-
mate claim.148 These statutes provide targets financial relief in the 
short term through a stay of discovery and in the long term through 
the recovery of attorney’s fees.149 Anti-SLAPP statutes also shift the 
burden onto the party filing the claim to support the claim’s validity 
at an earlier stage in litigation, putting an early halt to additional 
financial drain on the target’s resources.150 Moreover, anti-SLAPP 
statutes give targets the right of immediate appeal should they fail 
to successfully litigate their anti-SLAPP claim in the lower court.151 
These provisions would seem to provide sufficient protection 
from vindictive actors like Thiel, seeking to support potentially mer-
itless claims through revenge litigation funding. But anti-SLAPP 
statutes are not in force in every jurisdiction in the United States; 
and recently, judicial decisions have eroded these protections by ei-
ther questioning or prohibiting the application of state anti-SLAPP 
statutes in federal court.152 The lack of uniformity in application of 
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anti-SLAPP protections across jurisdictions leads to forum shop-
ping, where plaintiffs in anti-SLAPP law states can (and have) re-
moved claims from state to federal court, where they have better 
chances of avoiding protective procedural mechanisms.153 While a 
federal anti-SLAPP statute, like that proposed by a bipartisan group 
of representatives, would arguably resolve this problem, the likeli-
hood of passing such a statute is unclear.154 
Revenge litigation funding capitalizes on these legal vulnerabil-
ities, while also playing on other, less quantifiable factors. As de-
scribed herein, a growing discontent and mistrust of the media fuels 
inflated jury awards like that seen in Bollea.155 In that case, a juror 
reported that the $140 million award “wasn’t about punishment of 
these individuals and Gawker. You had [sic] to do it enough where 
it makes an example in society and other media organizations.”156 
One public figure in particular has stoked these kinds of negative 
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1333-37 (D.C. Cir. 2015). In Davide Carbone v. Cable News Network, a closely 
watched case in the Eleventh Circuit, the Northern District of Georgia sided with 
the minority view in an emerging circuit split on this issue. See Corey L. Andrews, 
Are Anti-’SLAPP’ Statutes Toothless In Federal Courts?, FORBES (Feb. 24, 2017, 
9:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2017/02/24/are-anti-slapp-statutes-
toothless-in-federal-courts/#60c443cb4a2c. Siding with the D.C. Circuit view, 
Judge Orinda Evans held that the standard for dismissal embodied in the federal 
rules “relate[s] only to how a litigant may bring his claims to court and bear[s] not 
at all on the substance of those rights or their enforcement.” Id. In the view of the 
court, absent any violation of the Rules Enabling Act, the federal rules governing 
dismissal are purely procedural and must be applied in federal court, regardless 
of any additional protections granted by state anti-SLAPP statutes. Id. 
 153 See, e.g., Order at 2, Dean v. NBC Universal, No. 2011 CA-006055-B 
(D.C. Super. Ct. June 25, 2012). 
 154 SPEAK FREE Act of 2015, H.R. 2304, 114th Cong. (2015). The bill has 
enjoyed rare bipartisan support and has won praise from Silicon Valley titans and 
free speech activists alike. See Eric Levitz, House Republicans Hope to Pass This 
Bill Before Donald Trump Takes Office, N.Y. MAG.: DAILY INTELLIGENCER (June 
1, 2016), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/06/gop-hopes-to-pass-this-
bill-before-trump-wins.html. Nevertheless, the fate of the bill remains uncertain 
in the current political climate. Id. As stated by the bill’s sponsor, Republican 
Congressman Blake Farenthold, “Obama will sign this. I don’t think Trump will.” 
Id. 
 155 See Bazelon, supra note 128. 
 156 Id. 
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attitudes towards the press: President Donald Trump.157 Trump, who 
has admitted to using intentionally abusive litigation tactics purely 
for the sake of harassment,158 also threatened to “open up our libel 
laws so when [journalists] write purposely negative and horrible and 
false articles, we can sue them and win lots of money.”159 While this 
threat is not a particularly frightening one when one stops to con-
sider that (a) this is what our libel laws are already designed to pro-
tect against, and (b) the president has no direct power to change 
these rules, Trump’s overt hostility towards the press reflects, and 
perhaps inspires, the kind of ire that leads to outsized awards from 
jurors.160 
This litigious attitude and hostility towards the press prompted 
many journalists to link Trump to their reports regarding the impli-
cations of Bollea.161 Trump has himself filed libel lawsuits at least 
                                                                                                             
 157 See Voters Divided, supra note 133. 
 158 See Bazelon, supra note 128. Trump was specifically quoted speaking 
about a libel lawsuit he filed against former New York Times reporter Tim 
O’Brien: “I spent a couple of bucks on legal fees, and they spent a whole lot more. 
I did it to make his life miserable, which I’m happy about.” See Paul Farhi, What 
Really Gets Under Trump’s Skin? A Reporter Questioning His Net Worth, WASH. 
POST (Mar. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/that-time-
trump-sued-over-the-size-of-hiswallet/2016/03/08/785dee3e-e4c2-11e5-b0fd-
073d5930a7b7_story.html?utm_term=.67938ee5601f. 
 159 See Nicholas Lemann, How Peter Thiel’s Gawker Battle Could Open a 
War Against the Press, NEW YORKER (May 31, 2016), www.newyorker.com/
news/news-desk/how-peter-thiels-gawker-battle-could-open-a-war-against-the-
press. 
 160 Some legal critics have suggested that a cap on damages akin to that em-
ployed in the United Kingdom would have prevented the “death” of Gawker. See, 
e.g., Bazelon, supra note 128. There, jurors in libel cases operate under an unof-
ficial damages cap of about £250,000. Id. Such a rule not only insulates British 
publishers from the kind of fallout seen in Bollea, but also encourages retractions 
and apologies by lowering the stakes of a potential libel lawsuit. Id. But caps on 
damage awards in libel cases would not have been particularly effective in Bollea, 
as the claims were brought on privacy grounds. Thiel’s assault on Gawker also 
included claims related to a class action labor lawsuit for which Harder’s firm was 
interviewing potential plaintiffs. See Drange, supra note 112. Moreover, as dis-
cussed herein, even in the absence of a jury award, the cost of legal fees for de-
fending against these claims would have eventually been enough to bankrupt the 
company. See Denton, supra note 85. 
 161 See, e.g., Katie Rogers & John Herrman, Thiel-Gawker Fight Raises Con-
cerns About Press Freedom, N.Y. TIMES: MEDIA (May 26, 2016), http://nyti.ms/
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seven times, winning only once: when a defendant failed to ap-
pear.162 Lawsuits aside, Trump’s ongoing public attacks on the 
press163 have contributed to the “chilling effect”—a phenomenon 
that prevents journalists and news organizations from reporting on 
plaintiffs with deep pockets or considerable power for fear of serious 
reprisal.164 This threat is not lessened by the fact that the “chilled” 
speech is accurate, of genuine public concern, or even within the 
legal limits of libel and defamation. As discussed below, even mer-
itless claims are a threat to the press when funded by vengeful ac-
tors. 
B. The Threat of “Meritless” Claims and Death by a 
Thousand Cuts 
Much of the press coverage regarding Thiel’s financial backing 
of Hogan’s case focused on the legality of his actions and the com-
monplace nature of third-party litigation funding in general.165 Com-
mentators also tended to posit that this sort of tactic is not a foolproof 
strategy.166 To be successful, the underlying claim must have 
                                                                                                             
1WnOTzP; see also Billionares’ Attack, supra note 128; see also Bazelon, supra 
note 128. 
 162 See Bazelon, supra note 128. 
 163 Prior to entering public office, Trump famously called CNN “fake news” 
following completely accurate and factual reports regarding potentially compro-
mising information held by the Russian state. During the same press conference, 
he referred to news website BuzzFeed as a “failing pile of garbage.” See Leonard 
Downie Jr., Donald Trump’s Dangerous Attacks on the Press, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/13/opinion/donald-trumps-danger-
ous-attacks-on-the-press.html. Since taking office, Trump’s attacks on the press 
have escalated to increasingly bizarre threats, culminating with a tweet in which 
he threatened to “revoke” the broadcasting licenses of news organizations he dis-
favors. See Allison Michaels, Can President Trump Really Revoke Broadcast Li-
censes, WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
post-politics/wp/2017/10/13/can-president-trump-really-revoke-broadcast-li-
censes/?utm_term=.73a47c2477c4 
 164 See Billionaires’ Attack, supra note 128. 
 165 See, e.g., Mark Joseph Stern, Peter Thiel Is Wrong About the First Amend-
ment, SLATE: JURIS. (May 26, 2016), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_
politics/jurisprudence/2016/05/should_peter_thiel_be_allowed_to_finance_
hulk_hogan_s_lawsuit.html. Stern’s article notes that third-party litigation fund-
ing is not unusual and is commonly employed in civil rights cases. Id. 
 166 Id.; see also Eugene Kontorovich, Peter Thiel’s Funding of Hulk Hogan-
Gawker Litigation Should Not Raise Concerns, WALL ST. J.: VOLOKH 
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merit.167 One commentator reasoned that “to destroy a media com-
pany, it is not enough that litigation be financed. A court must also 
find the defendant liable, award damages and have it sustained on 
appeal.”168 Otherwise, the suits would be dismissed, or, in an ex-
treme situation, an attorney bringing a frivolous claim would be sub-
ject to court sanction.169 These arguments echo the reasoning of 
those voices championing the abandonment of the doctrines of 
champerty and maintenance, who believe that the evolution of the 
legal system and the development of ethical accountability rules 
have done away with the need for these prohibitive laws.170 
These observations ignore the reality of the current American 
legal system. Granted, litigating a claim in the United States is more 
costly than in any other country in the world171 and, all things being 
equal, normal market forces theoretically prevent meritless claims 
from wreaking havoc on the system.172 Because the costs of litiga-
tion mount quickly, parties with frivolous claims are hesitant to file 
costly lawsuits with low probabilities of success.173 Attorneys who 
might litigate cases on a contingency basis are equally unlikely to 
take on the risk.174 In an effort to ensure a maximum return, most 
third-party litigation funders employ vetting mechanisms that eval-
uate whether claims have a high probability of success.175 Logically, 
                                                                                                             
CONSPIRACY (May 26, 2016), www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspir-
acy/wp/2016/05/26/peter-thiels-funding-of-hulk-hogan-gawker-litigation-
should-not-raise-concerns/?utm_term=.1c3319353f24. 
 167 See Stern, supra note 165. 
 168 See Kontorovich, supra note 166. 
 169 See Stern, supra note 165. 
 170 See BURFORD CAP., supra note 43. 
 171 U.S. Legal System Is World’s Most Costly According to a New Study, U.S. 
CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM (May 14, 2013), http://www.instituteforle-
galreform.com/resource/us-legal-system-is-worlds-most-costly-according-to-a-
new-study. 
 172 See id. 
 173 See id. 
 174 See id. 
 175 See Randazzo, supra note 3. Litigation funders typically employ legal ex-
perts who analyze claims on the basis of potential success, taking into account 
both evidentiary and legal elements, including the favorability of the venue and 
jurisdiction. Some (like the Thiel funded start-up Legalist) have developed their 
own internal algorithms that calculate the chances of success and even estimate 
the time it would take to litigate the claim. See Biz Carson, One of Peter Thiel’s 
Fellows Created a New Startup that Will Fund Your Lawsuit, BUS. INSIDER: TECH 
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these kinds of litigation investors are typically uninterested in mer-
itless, or even risky, claims; as such, it stands to reason that funders 
do not increase the presence of such claims in the legal system.176 
However, as seen in Bollea v. Gawker, the introduction of a third-
party funder with no interest in pecuniary gain alters the judicial 
ecosystem.177 
A vengeful party like Thiel who intends to “bankrupt, buy or 
wound”178 a media outlet is not constrained by the economic pres-
sures that would prevent the filing of a meritless lawsuit. Notably, 
our system sees each party covering the costs of its own representa-
tion (barring a specific state or federal law that says otherwise). 
Therefore, the fact that a media outlet like Gawker is required to pay 
attorney’s fees when attempting to dismiss or even respond to a 
complaint means that a “successful” claim is not essential to exact 
revenge.179 Instead, a funder can employ a strategy of death by a 
thousand cuts180—providing litigation funds to any party with a 
claim against their target, no matter how unlikely it is to succeed. 
Through this method, success could be had through a cumulative or 
aggregate effect, rather than the singular blow represented by Bollea 
v. Gawker. 
This is precisely the strategy Thiel likely intended to employ.181 
While Thiel has not disclosed exactly how many other cases he fi-
nanced,182 he admits that Hogan was not the sole beneficiary of his 
                                                                                                             
INSIDER (Aug. 24, 2016, 2:05 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/legalist-will-
fund-your-lawsuit-if-it-thinks-you-have-a-good-shot-at-winning-2016-8. 
 176 See Carson, supra note 175. 
 177 See Bazelon, supra note 128. 
 178 See Denton, supra note 85. 
 179 See, e.g., Clara Jeffery & Monika Bauerlein, Why We’re Stuck With 
$650,000 in Legal Fees, Despite Beating the Billionaire Who Sued Us, MOTHER 
JONES (Oct. 23, 2015, 2:46 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2015/10/
why-wont-we-get-our-legal-fees-back [hereinafter Why We’re Stuck]. 
 180 See Lili Levi, The Weaponized Lawsuit Against the Media: Litigation 
Funding as a New Threat to Journalism, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 761, 785 (2017). 
 181 See Drange, supra note 112. 
 182 The most Thiel has been willing to disclose is that it is “safe to say [Bollea 
v. Gawker] is not the only one.” Id. 
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vendetta.183 Though Thiel’s backing of any particular case is uncon-
firmed, the firm he paid to represent Hogan has sued Gawker at least 
five times since 2013.184 
Among those lawsuits is a defamation case filed on behalf of 
Shiva Ayyadurai, an Indian-American scientist who claims to “have 
invented email.”185 Ayyadurai was the subject of an article by Sam 
Biddle, who argued that e-mail was developed at least a decade be-
fore Ayyadurai claims to have invented it.186 Even though according 
to many experts and historians, “[e]lectronic mail predates Ayyadu-
rai’s ability to spell, let alone code,”187 Gawker settled the lawsuit 
for $750,000 as part of the settlement with Hogan.188 Ayyadurai 
claims to be “unaware of any behind-the-scenes financial arrange-
ments involving [his] attorneys and anyone else.”189 
Another claim litigated by Harder and settled alongside Hogan’s 
was that of freelance journalist Ashley Terrill.190 Terrill sued 
Gawker and Biddle for defamation after the site published an article 
detailing her well-documented investigation into the dating applica-
tion (“app”) Tinder and Terrill’s belief that she was being harassed 
                                                                                                             
 183 Id. 
 184 See id. 
 185 See id. 
 186 See Sam Biddle, Corruption, Lies, and Death Threats: The Crazy Story of 
the Man Who Pretended to Invent Email, GAWKER: GIZMODO (Mar. 5, 2012, 2:50 
PM), web.archive.org/web/20120306204240/http://gizmodo.com/5888702/cor-
ruption-lies-and-death-threats-the-crazy-story-of-the-man-who-pretended-to-in-
vent-email. 
 187 See Mario Aguilar, Internet Pioneers Slam $750,000 Settlement for the 
‘Man Who Invented Email’, GAWKER: GIZMODO (Nov. 4, 2016, 3:20 PM), 
http://gizmodo.com/internet-pioneers-slam-750-000-settlement-for-the-man-178
8503950. 
 188 See id. 
 189 See Drange, supra note 112. 
 190 See Peter Sterne, Here Are All the People Suing Gawker, POLITICO: MEDIA 
(June 15, 2016, 8:39 AM), http://www.politico.com/media/story/2016/06/here-
are-all-the-people-suing-gawker-004601. 
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by one of the app’s co-founders.191 Gawker’s offer of settlement to 
Ms. Terrill amounted to $500,000.192 
In a blog reflecting on the outcome of the litigation, Denton 
wrote that Gawker “expected to prevail” in the lawsuits brought by 
Ayyadurai and Terrill, and that he was “confident the appeals court 
would reduce or eliminate the runaway Florida judgment against 
Gawker.”193 Citing to Thiel’s own public commitment to “support 
[Hogan] until his final victory” and to “gladly support someone else 
in the same position,”194 Denton wrote that the threat of Thiel’s re-
lentlessness and his tremendous financial capability motivated a set-
tlement that would prevent “endless litigation.”195 
Denton was not alone in his belief that Gawker would succeed 
in its appeal of Hogan’s award.196 Given the rationale of Judge Whit-
temore197 and Judge Black,198 it would stand to reason that the out-
sized award in Bollea v. Gawker would not survive appellate scru-
tiny. But the financial reality of facing a foe with practically limit-
less resources presented a battle that Gawker could simply not afford 
to continue fighting, no matter how likely its eventual legal vindica-
tion.199 To illustrate, Gawker’s legal fees for the Hogan case alone 
                                                                                                             
 191 See id.; see also Sam Biddle, Tinder Confidential: The Hookup App’s 
Founders Can’t Swipe Away the Past, GAWKER (Nov. 23, 2015, 11:32 AM), 
http://gawker.com/tag/ashley-terrill. 
 192 See Sydney Ember, Gawker and Hulk Hogan Reach $31 Million Settle-
ment, N.Y. TIMES: MEDIA (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/03/
business/media/gawker-hulk-hogan-settlement.html. 
 193 See Nick Denton, A Hard Peace, NICKDENTON.ORG (Nov. 2, 2016), 
https://nickdenton.org/a-hard-peace-e161e19bfaf#.odd4bp3um [hereinafter Hard 
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 195 See Hard Peace, supra note 193. 
 196 See, e.g., Toobin, supra note 72. 
 197 See Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, No. 8:12–cv–02348–T–27TBM, 2012 
WL 5509624, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 2012). 
 198 See Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, 129 So. 3d 1196, 1199 (Fla. 2d DCA 
2014). 
 199 See Ember, supra note 192; see also L. Gordon Crovitz, Peter Thiel’s Le-
gal Smackdown, WALL ST. J.: INFO. AGE (June 5, 2016, 5:47 PM), http://
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totaled almost $10 million.200 Even without the breathtaking $140 
million Bollea verdict, the site (which would have broken even with-
out paying legal fees) was operating at a loss and initiating layoffs 
to mitigate the cost of litigating cases, at least one of which was fi-
nanced by Thiel.201 With Thiel showing no signs of abandoning his 
vendetta against Gawker, and outside financing in the face of the 
looming award unlikely, the site had little chance of survival. The 
legal merit of any particular claim Thiel might seek to weaponize 
against them was inconsequential—so long as Thiel was willing to 
leverage the legal system as a means of bleeding Gawker’s finances, 
his eventual victory was certain. 
While some have dismissed Thiel’s third-party funded onslaught 
against Gawker as an isolated incident, at least one other billionaire 
also adopted Thiel’s so-called “philanthropic”202 approach to com-
bating the press.203 In 2012, Idaho billionaire and Republican mega-
donor Frank VanderSloot filed a defamation lawsuit against the 
magazine Mother Jones.204 VanderSloot claimed that Mother Jones 
had defamed him by “falsely stating that Mr. VanderSloot ‘bashed’ 
and ‘publicly out[ed] a reporter.”205 VanderSloot, who has an exten-
sive history of anti-gay-rights activism that included running a series 
of ads attacking a gay journalist,206 has since changed his views on 
LGBT issues, even writing an op-ed declaring his belief that “gay 
people should have the same freedoms and rights as any other indi-
vidual.”207 This evolution aside, the court found Mother Jones did 
not defame VanderSloot, holding that all statements in the article 
were “non-actionable truth or substantial truth.”208 
That fact did not stop VanderSloot from litigating his claim for 
more than two years, costing Mother Jones a reported $2.5 million 
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 201 See id. 
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in legal fees.209 Mother Jones’s insurance did not cover the entire 
cost, leaving the magazine to pay a tab in excess of $600,000.210 And 
because Idaho does not have an anti-SLAPP law,211 Mother Jones 
could not recover its legal fees absent a finding from the judge (who 
had already specified that VanderSloot’s case was not frivolous) that 
the lawsuit was pursued “frivolously, unreasonably, or without 
foundation.”212 
Despite Mother Jones’s victory, VanderSloot had effectively 
succeeded, not only by harassing the magazine and its staff, but also 
by draining its resources.213 After his defeat, VanderSloot estab-
lished the “Guardian of True Liberty Fund,”214 personally pledging 
one million dollars to “help individuals who have been unfairly at-
tacked by the liberal media mount a legal defense, the costs of which 
can be overwhelming.”215 Where Thiel covertly limited his efforts 
to toppling a specific site, VanderSloot widened the aperture, ac-
tively and publicly shopping for plaintiffs who would bring claims 
against any and all liberal media outlets.216 
VanderSloot’s own case, and his subsequent open call for 
would-be plaintiffs, demonstrate that third-party litigation funding, 
when employed by vindictive actors uninterested in pecuniary gain, 
does in fact have the potential to weaponize even non-meritorious 
claims. As such, lawsuits funded by Thiel and VanderSloot expose 
the ongoing vulnerability and shortcomings of our modern legal sys-
tem, where a party with the deepest pockets can drag on litigation 
for years, papering the opposing side to death, no matter how base-
less the claim. 
The absence of a federal anti-SLAPP statute likewise ensures 
that those interested in this style of revenge litigation funding are 
free to forum shop. In other words, these revenge litigation funders 
                                                                                                             
 209 See Bazelon, supra note 128. 
 210 See Why We’re Stuck, supra note 179. 
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are able to seek out claims in jurisdictions with the weakest protec-
tions for the press, where even a plaintiff’s loss in court will inflict 
potentially fatal economic damage to a defendant news organiza-
tion. Alternately, as in the case of Bollea v. Gawker, a plaintiff, per-
haps swayed by the motives of his or her silent benefactor, may drop 
claims typically covered by media insurers in an effort to exact as 
much financial damage as possible in the event of a large award.217 
As such, the modern “protections” afforded by the legal system and 
ethics rules (and advocated by those who no longer see the utility of 
champerty and maintenance restrictions) are not enough to neutral-
ize the threat—even of non-meritorious claims—to the Fourth Es-
tate. 
C. Champerty and Maintenance to the Rescue? 
Despite the legal protections afforded to the Fourth Estate by 
virtue of the Constitution and the American tradition of freedom of 
the press, media organizations remain vulnerable to attack via re-
venge litigation funding schemes. Claims lobbed at the press and 
financed by vindictive actors, whether with merit or without, are not 
constrained by the typical market forces and judicial mechanisms 
that would eliminate the potential financial peril posed by the threat 
of persistent litigation. Contrary to the arguments of those who see 
no practical use for the doctrines of champerty and maintenance, in 
those jurisdictions that continue to apply the doctrine, there is some 
hope that it might be used by media organizations to counteract at-
tacks from those who would seek to silence them through these kind 
of covert (or in the case of VanderSloot, overt) methods of funding. 
As noted in Part I, states that apply the doctrines of champerty 
and maintenance restrict the practice to varying degrees and tend to 
approach their analysis as to whether an agreement is champertous 
from a myriad of perspectives. But one thing that all such jurisdic-
tions seem to disdain is the mere suggestion that a third party is be-
having as an officious intermeddler. As reasoned by the Superior 
Court of Delaware, an agreement is more likely to be deemed cham-
pertous or in violation of the maintenance doctrine if the third-party 
“‘stirred up’ litigation” or has a controlling hand in the litigation 
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strategy.218 Moreover, courts are more likely to hold that a party is 
an officious intermeddler and that an agreement is champertous 
where the funder seeks out the claimholder (rather than the party 
holding the claim seeking out the funder).219 
Under this rationale, in a state with champerty and maintenance 
restrictions, should a case arise that is funded by VanderSloot’s 
plaintiff-shopping Guardian of True Liberty Fund, the defendant 
could argue that the claims must be dismissed on the basis that the 
third-party litigation funding agreement is champertous, and that 
VanderSloot’s fund is operating as an officious intermeddler. These 
arguments would be supported by the fact that VanderSloot “stirred 
up” litigation by advertising an interest in suing a specific target: 
liberal media outlets. 
Moreover, a defendant news organization in Gawker’s position 
might argue that a revenge litigation funder is an officious intermed-
dler if it can show that the funder is interfering in or influencing the 
course of litigation. In Bollea, the moment to file a motion to dismiss 
on this basis might have arisen at the point that Hogan’s legal team 
dropped the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim—some-
thing that Gawker’s insurance would have covered.220 
Though Harder would have argued that this was a tactical deci-
sion unrelated to any motives Thiel may have had, in a jurisdiction 
with champerty and maintenance restrictions, Gawker’s attorneys 
could have made the argument that this was evidence of Thiel’s ac-
tions as an officious intermeddler.221 As noted herein, the most log-
ical inference drawn from elimination of the negligent infliction of 
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emotional distress claim would be that a party wanted to ensure that 
any judgment would have to come directly from Gawker’s own 
pockets, inflicting the maximum amount of financial damage possi-
ble. Bolstering this argument is the fact that Hogan rejected several 
offers of settlement, only to eventually agree to accept a fraction of 
the judgment awarded by the court.222 
However, gathering enough evidence to support this kind of 
claim would likely prove difficult. Barring discovery of communi-
cations between Thiel and Harder or Hogan that laid bare Thiel’s 
meddling, or an explicit provision in the funding agreement that al-
lowed for the funder to dictate legal strategy, it is unlikely that a 
court would comfortably side with the defendant. 
Moreover, decisions like that seen in Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission223 continue to expand the definition of what 
qualifies as speech within the meaning of the First Amendment.224 
The kind of corporate political expenditure that was deemed pro-
tected in Citizens United could potentially be extended to cover the 
expenses of a private citizen (or fund, in the case of VanderSloot) 
seeking to support what he or she characterizes as public interest 
litigation.225 In fact, Thiel cleverly characterized his funding of Bol-
lea as public interest litigation,226 aligning himself with decisions 
like NAACP v. Button, which protects third-party support of litiga-
tion that seeks the “vindication of constitutional rights.”227 The dif-
ficulty of drawing the line between a claim like that in Button and 
that of a third-party actor with a personal vendetta would likely be 
too amorphous for courts to unravel and properly administer. No 
                                                                                                             
 222 See Toobin, supra note 72; see also Mac & Drange, supra note 96. 
 223 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). The 
case is notable for a ruling that protected unlimited corporate and union expendi-
tures in election campaigns. Id. 
 224 Id. 
 225 See Bradley C. Tobias, Note, Officious Intermeddling or Protected First 
Amendment Activity? The Constitutionality of Prohibiting Champerty Law After 
Citizens United, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1293, 1318 (2014). In fact, the 
motivation behind overturning champerty and maintenance restrictions in the ma-
jority of southern states during the civil rights movement was the desire to protect 
the interests of plaintiffs in civil rights lawsuits, whose claims were typically sup-
ported by organizations like the NAACP. See Steinitz, supra note 1, at 1287–88. 
 226 See, e.g., Toobin, supra note 72. 
 227 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 443 (1963). 
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case has yet to test this theory of revenge litigation funding as 
speech, but with the ongoing erosion of the champerty and mainte-
nance restrictions as they apply to third-party funding, it is unlikely 
that an appeal on these grounds will serve targeted media organiza-
tions much longer, if at all.228 
What, then, might offer the most effective protection for organ-
izations like Gawker, Mother Jones, and other targets of revenge 
litigation funding? Besides the adoption of strong anti-SLAPP stat-
utes on the state and federal level that could guard against the effec-
tiveness of revenge litigation funding models,229 news organizations 
(and the entities that support them)230 now find themselves in a po-
sition to push for increased regulation of third-party litigation fund-
ing, and amendments to the rules of discovery and evidence that 
would allow for the disclosure of the identity of a third-party funder. 
Regulations that media organizations should push for would in-
clude strict restrictions against funder interference in the attorney-
                                                                                                             
 228 More importantly, Bollea was decided in a Florida state court, a jurisdic-
tion that does not recognize champerty and maintenance restrictions. See Hardick 
v. Homol, 795 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (holding that champerty and 
maintenance are no longer viable causes of action in Florida). As such, an argu-
ment on these grounds would be unavailing. 
 229 For example, the Florida anti-SLAPP statute only protects against claims 
arising in the context of a homeowner’s association dispute or from a lawsuit by 
the government against a journalist or private citizen speaking out against its ac-
tions. FLA. STAT. § 768.295 (2015). If the Florida statute mirrored that of the 
Washington D.C. statute, which is expanded to claims of almost any kind, perhaps 
Hogan’s trial would have been halted before it even began. See D.C. CODE § 16-
5502 (2012). 
 230 Ironically, Thiel supported one such non-profit organization, the Commit-
tee to Protect Journalists (“CPJ”). COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS, https://
www.cpj.org/about (last visited Sept. 30, 2017). The CPJ is “an independent, non-
profit organization that promotes press freedom worldwide” and defends “the 
right of journalists to report the news without fear of reprisal.” Id. Thiel provided 
significant financial support to the CPJ from July 2008 to January 2013, but was 
criticized by its Executive Director, Joel Simon, for “support[ing] efforts to abuse 
the [legal system] by seeking to punish or bankrupt particular media outlets.” See 
CPJ Reacts to Reports that Peter Thiel Has Funded Lawsuits Against Gawker, 
COMM. TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (May 25, 2016, 1:09 PM), https://cpj.org/
2016/05/cpj-reacts-to-reports-that-peter-thiel-has-funded-.php. Other organiza-
tions that should join in an effort to defend against revenge litigation funding at-
tacks on the media include the Media Advocacy Group, First Look Media’s Press 
Freedom Litigation Fund, and the Society of Professional Journalists. 
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client relationship during the course of litigation that mirror the 
strong protections granted by the ethics rules. In addition, news or-
ganizations should propose proportional caps on return on invest-
ments in individual cases. This kind of regulatory cap would be most 
effective in the case of a formal fund that operates under a “replen-
ishment” scheme. In theory, a cap on the amount or proportion of an 
award that a third-party funder is able to recoup from any given case 
would temper a funder’s desire to push litigation forward beyond 
the point where cases could reasonably settle and avoid the risk of 
losing any return altogether. This theory assumes that a revenge lit-
igation funder operating from a formal fund that relies on external 
donations (like VanderSloot’s Guardian of True Liberty Fund)231 
aims to replenish its funds with a percentage of the award from 
claims it supports. On the other hand, a cap would prove ineffective 
where a party is willing to part ways with as much of its resources 
as necessary to exact revenge. 
On the evidentiary front, it would be beneficial to media organ-
izations to lobby for rules of civil procedure that would allow for the 
discovery and disclosure of the presence of a third-party funder in 
any given case. The discoverability of a third-party funding agree-
ment would, at the very least, alert the defendant of potential ulterior 
motives, possibly prompting the ability to file an anti-SLAPP claim 
that would dispose of the controversy. Ideally, an evidentiary rule 
that would benefit media organizations under attack from revenge 
litigation funders would require the disclosure of any previous con-
flicts the third-party funder had with the defendants. Moreover, 
should the defendant find an avenue of relevance that would allow 
for the introduction of the presence of the third-party funder as evi-
dence during the proceeding, jurors would be less likely to fall for 
the kind of David vs. Goliath narrative crafted by plaintiffs like Ho-
gan. This would, at a minimum, level the playing field for media 
organizations by unveiling the presence of deep pockets. 
                                                                                                             
 231 See GUARDIAN OF TRUE LIBERTY, supra note 214. 
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Appeals to lawmakers to protect the integrity of the press could 
not come at a more crucial moment. President Trump’s general liti-
gious attitude,232 declaration of “war with the media,”233 and habit 
of disseminating false information234 make for a precarious combi-
nation in an era of skepticism towards the reliability of the press.235 
On the one hand, the contentious political climate is a hotbed of 
journalistic activity, especially as the presidential administration 
struggles to keep its internal blunders under wraps.236 However, le-
gal scholars have noted that “the libel climate is changing” and that 
public figures are likely to capitalize on this moment, when they 
“may be more confident that courts and juries will be sympathetic 
to their claims.”237 If the result of this climate is a weakened Fourth 
Estate that is hesitant to report the news for fear of backlash from 
the powerful actors they are called to report on, the real costs will 
be borne by an uninformed and more easily manipulated American 
public. 
CONCLUSION 
From their inception, the doctrines of champerty and mainte-
nance were developed to prevent “great men” from manipulating the 
                                                                                                             
 232 See Bazelon, supra note 128; see also Farhi, supra note 158. 
 233 See David Bauder, Trump’s “War with the Media” Raises Questions of 
Trust, SALON.COM (Jan. 22, 2017, 7:39 PM), http://www.salon.com/2017/01/23/
trumps-war-with-the-media-raises-questions-of-trust/. 
 234 See, e.g., Daniel Politi, Donald Trump Uses Twitter to Flat Out Lie About 
“Millions” of Illegal Votes in Election, SLATE (Nov. 28, 2016, 12:09 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2016/11/28/donald_trump_uses_twitter_
to_lie_about_millions_of_illegal_votes_in_election.html. 
 235 See Paul Farhi, Why There’s Never Been a Better Time to Sue a Journalist, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/
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 236 See Paul Farhi, The Trump Administration Has Sprung a Leak. Many of 
Them, in Fact., WASH. POST (Feb. 5, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
lifestyle/style/the-trump-administration-has-sprung-a-leak-many-of-them-in-
fact/2017/02/05/a13fad24-ebe2-11e6-b4ff-ac2cf509efe5_story.html?utm_term=.
1154fe3da9e1. Farhi notes that Trump has already demanded an investigation into 
who may have leaked a top-secret report about Russian hacking of Democratic 
officials during the 2016 presidential campaign to NBC News. Id. 
 237 Farhi, supra note 235. 
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vulnerability of an imperfect legal system to achieve their own ne-
farious ends and exact revenge on their rivals.238  The “great men” 
of today are not feudal lords attempting to game the system with the 
aim of aggrandizing their own estates or sullying their rival’s names. 
Instead, they are vengeful actors, seeking to shield their own repu-
tations and agendas from attack or criticism from the media, no mat-
ter how deserved or accurate the coverage might be. Revenge litiga-
tion funding affords these vindictive actors a means through which 
to weaponize torts and inflict tremendous damage upon their targets, 
even with claims that would not typically survive legal scrutiny. 
While the underlying rationale that motivated the creation of 
these restrictions would seem to align perfectly with the desire to 
protect news organizations from attack by revenge litigation fun-
ders, the difficulties of drawing distinctions between these vengeful 
claims and the kind of public interest litigation that advanced the 
civil rights movement means that application or revival of the doc-
trine would likely be futile. Nevertheless, media organizations 
would benefit by capitalizing on the lessons learned from the Bollea 
v. Gawker/Thiel controversy and engaging with the third-party liti-
gation funding industry at large to lobby for the implementation of 
rules and regulations, of the kind outlined herein, to better insulate 
them from these kinds of abusive litigation tactics in the future. 
                                                                                                             
 238 See Dobner, supra note 12, at 1544. 
